Jeannerod, 1999). The principle of this functional equivalence suggests that similar neural 5 processes are involved in the physical execution, mental simulation and observation of an 6 action, since each operation is proposed to be assigned to the same internal brain 7 representation (Jeannerod, 1994; Jeannerod, 1999) . 8 At a behavioral level, functional equivalence has been considered through timing 9 paradigms by comparing the time taken to physically complete an action with the time 10 required to mentally perform the same task (see Guillot & Collet, 2005 for a review). A 11 number of studies have shown that motor rules evident for physical actions (e.g., Fitts' Law 12 and The Isochrony Principle) are also maintained during imagery conditions for laboratory- (Parsons, 1994) ; and the nature of the skill 2 (Mackay, 1981) . Extended time for mental execution of an action has been found in 3 comparison to the physically task time. This was observed when participants performed tasks 4 under imagined loaded conditions (Cerritelli et al., 2000; Decety et al., 1989 ) and during 5 actual performance on a beam walking task after having simulated it (Decety, 1991) . In the 6 latter case, the time to mentally complete the task also increased with the difficulty of the task 7 (i.e., reducing the width of the beam). In contrast, actual movement duration was found to 8 exceed imagined movement duration for uncommon hand orientations and uncomfortable 9 kinesthetic sensations (Parsons, 1994) and for skill in speech production (Mackay, 1981) . 10 A number of explanations have been offered for the disparity between mental and 11 actual durations. In tasks concerning carrying weights, Decety et al. (1989) and Jeannerod 12 (1994) have suggested that during imagery conditions, individuals perceive extra force as an 13 increase in duration. In tasks involving unfamiliar actions, Parsons (1994) has proposed that 14 the imagery process is incapable of completely taking into account the characteristics of 15 unfamiliar postures and that this may explain the generation of sketchy and rapid simulations 16 for such tasks. In speech production tasks, Mackay (1981, 1982) suggested that reading a 17 sentence mentally, as quickly as possible, was faster than saying it overtly because it did not 18 involve full recruitment of the motor system. Linked to this idea, physically producing an 19 action prior to starting imagery of the same action might promote greater additional 20 kinesthetic awareness and, potentially, alter the timing of the image. Research findings in this 21 area have been contradictory. Coello and Orliaguet (1992) showed that, for novice golf 22 players, the duration of an imaged movement did not vary whether or not there were 23 preliminary physical executions of the movement. In contrast, Decety (1991) found the 24 opposite for undergraduate students who had to walk on wooden beams of different width. tasks. In these studies, the time to imagine a performance was quicker than that of the actual 10 performance. They also reveal that the relationship between actual and simulated movement is 11 modified by the complexity of the skill or the participants' expertise (e.g., Reed, 2002) . Reed 12 has suggested that task complexity has an effect on the imagery-action relationship; as 13 rotational complexity increased, imaged times increased relative to the physical times. She 14 also proposed that temporal discrepancies between imagined and actual behavior may be a 15 consequence of schematic differences in skill representation since expertise modifies the 16 cognitive organization of a skill (Karmiloff-Smith, 1990 Dividing an action into discrete temporal epochs allows examination of the duration of 1 the different stages of an action under imagined and actual conditions. This provides the 2 opportunity to appraise the time course of mental processing. It also allows consideration of 3 the mechanisms involved as individuals perform an action under different conditions. More 4 specifically, investigating whether different conditions of generating an action (i.e., actually 5 or mentally) modify the temporal organization of the stages that constitute this action. The two perspectives seem to be controlled by different processes (e.g., Farrer & Frith, 1 2002). Brain areas activated during a first-person perspective, as revealed through positron 2 emission tomography (PET), do not match those activated during a third-person perspective 3 (Decety et al., 1994). The former has been proposed to "rely on motor-kinesthetic information 4 processing" whereas the latter "rely more on visuospatial processing" (Decety, 1996, p.46) 5 and do not preferentially use motor mechanisms (Sirigu & Duhamel, 2001) . Ruby and Decty 6 (2001) have also shown that whilst imagery an action from a first and third-person perspective 7 activated common brain areas (i.e., SMA, the precentral gyrus, the precuneus, and the 8 occipito-tempoal junction) further specific activity was observed in the third-person 9 perspective (right inferior parietal cortex and precuneus) and during a first-person perspective 10 (left inferior parietal cortex and somatosensory areas). In support of the evidence for some 11 perspective specificity, Fourkas, Avenanti, Urgesi, and Aglioti (2006) have provided evidence 12 that imagery of a movement increased corticospinal excitability and that this excitability was 13 greatest during a third-person perspective in comparison to a first-person perspective. 14 If neural correlates are associated with temporal patterning of behavior then these 15 structural differences suggest that the timing of different imagery perspective may also be 16 different. If the third-person perspective relies on more spatial processes (Decety, 1996; 17 Sirigu & Duhamel, 2001), mental simulation may be faster than actual execution because it 18 does not seem to evoke motor processing (Mackay, 1981 (Mackay, , 1982 . Following a similar line of 19 argument, imagined movements performed from a first-person perspective should have a 20 temporal pattern closer to that of the physical movement because the motor representations 21 employed are similar to those activated during physical execution of the action with the 22 exception of motor output (Jeannerod, 1997). Whilst not directly linked to temporal 23 patterning, the case for a first-person perspective has also been shown by Wang and Morgan 24 (1992) . Their study of visual perspective effects on imagined exercise demonstrated that 25 CHRONOMETRIC COMPARISON 10 ventilation and effort sense were higher when an internal imagery perspective was employed 1 compared to an external imagery perspective. Despite some observed similarities between 2 internal and external conditions in metabolic and cardiovascular responses, the authors 3 concluded that internal imagery had the closest resemblance to actual exercise. 4 It was of interest, therefore, to examine the temporal functional equivalence for a 5 complex task during imagery from an internal visual perspective (i.e., first-person 6 perspective) and also from an external visual perspective (i.e., third-person perspective). 7 Consideration of the temporal organization of a complex task under these conditions was 8 proposed to reveal information relating to motor control processes and further increase 9 understanding of the relationship between mental and actual behavior duration. 10 It was predicted that an internal visual perspective would show greater temporal 11 functional equivalence with the physical condition compared to the external visual perspective 12 for the full action. The external visual perspective was hypothesized to show significantly 13 faster times than the internal perspective and the actual action times. No a priori hypotheses 14 were offered concerning the temporal organization of the complex task under imagined and 15 actual conditions, since there was insufficient literature to support informed predictions. 16 Gymnastics routines offer diverse elements executed by the whole body around 17 longitudinal, transversal and/or lateral axes. An exercise on the vault was chosen because of 18 the ease with which routines can be broken down into clearly defined, recognized stages. 19 Each stage is interpreted in the same way for each gymnast and so provides easily accessible 20 epochs for comparison. In addition, using elite female athletes as participants offers a high 21 level of ecological validity and population rarely seen in the psychology literature. were not estimating the time or counting during the period when they were imaging. 19 Clarification was also made to ensure that the perspective used by the participants during the 20 experimental session was the same as the perspective identified by the VMIQ. Debriefs also 21 confirmed that the gymnasts were not switching from one perspective to another one within 22 the mental simulation and that they had followed the instructions for the content of imagery. 23 Second, information concerning the gymnasts' imagery process was also assessed. 24 This included the ease of image control, the imagery vividness, the use of other imagery 25 CHRONOMETRIC COMPARISON 13 modalities (e.g., auditory, kinesthetic, olfactory), and any emotion associated with the 1 imagery process. The following questions were asked: Using the 5-point scale, was it easy or 2 difficult to generate mental images?; how vivid were your images?; what did you see as you 3 mentally simulated your vault routine?; do you think you simulated mentally your whole 4 vault, and each of its four stages, at the same rate as in reality, or was it quicker or slower?; as 5 you mentally simulated your vault routine, did you feel any sensations in your muscles?; did Again, a significant difference was found between the two perspectives (Z = 2.02, p < .05). 20 There was full agreement across all assessment methods. The preferential perspective 21 for each gymnast matched that identified through the VMIQ and was consistent with the 22 reports of the corresponding gymnast. One participant, with no dominant VMIQ perspective, 23 indicated switching between imagery perspectives when mentally rehearsing her vault. She 24 was removed from the study.
CHRONOMETRIC COMPARISON 14
Experimental session. A between-subject design was employed in the present study. 1 The gymnasts were free to warm-up before starting the experimental session using their 2 normal routines. During this period of time, the experimental team did not control the way 3 participants prepared themselves to execute the actual vault and whether imagery was used. 4 The experimentation began after the gymnasts indicated that they were ready. 5 The gymnasts were asked to imagine performing the vault task in their preferred The four stages of the Yurchenko vault were defined in this way because they were familiar 22 and meaningful to all the gymnasts and since they matched the typical learning stages of this 23 particular vault.
CHRONOMETRIC COMPARISON 15
A finger tapping procedure was employed to allow the gymnasts to identify each stage 1 of the vault during the imagery process. Gymnasts were instructed to tap their fingers on their 2 thigh as they reached each stage transition and to make the onset of the tapping coincide with 3 the beginning of each stage of the imagined vault. Five taps were performed whilst they 4 imagined their vault and the four stages were identified for each participant. The motor 5 command to tap the leg could be seen as adding time to the mental stage. However, we would 6 suggest that the time to tap was perceived not to add extra time to the time required to 7 imagine the movement since participants decided consciously to prepare their finger tap 8 before actually doing it. This argument is in line with Libet (1985) who has shown that when 9 individuals executed freely voluntary acts (e.g., flexion of the wrist at any time they chose), 10 they became aware of their intention to move about 200ms before they actually moved. A 11 conscious anticipation seems to be present that would not significantly increase movement 12 times in the imagery conditions. Gymnasts were given five practice attempts to habituate to 13 the signaling system and reinforce that tapping at the start of each phase. Table 1 ). The duration of the full vault exercise was consistent across the three 17 trials and in both perspectives, the time to imagine the full vault was not significantly 18 different to the time required to physically perform it (see Table 2 , Figure 2 ). ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for the stage factor, F(3,42) = 434.8731, p 1 < .000001 (see Table 3 ). Tukey's HSD post-hoc tests showed that irrespective of perspective, 2 trial, and condition, duration of stage1 (3.569 sec) was greater than the duration of stages 2 3 (0.630 sec) (p < .0002), 3 (0.511 sec) (p < .0002), and 4 (0.960 sec) (p < .0002). Durations of 4 stages 2 and 3 were also less than the duration of stage 4 (p < .007, for stage 2; p < .0003, for 5 stage 3). 6 ANOVA revealed a significant stage-trial interaction, F(6,84) = 2.7672, p < .02 (see 7 Table 3 ). Regardless of perspective and condition, Tukey's HSD post-hoc tests indicated that 8 trial durations did not change across each stage except for stage 1. Trial 1 duration (3.504 sec) 9 was faster than trial 3 duration (3.621 sec) (p < .03).
10
ANOVA displayed a significant stage-condition interaction, F(3,42) = 125.9179, p < 11 .000001 (see Table 3 ). Tukey's HSD post-hoc tests showed that participants using both visual 12 perspectives mentally simulated stage 1 (run phase) at a faster rate (p < .001) and stages 2 and 13 3 (first flight phase and arm support phase) at a slower rate (p < .0004, for stage 2; p < .0003, 14 for stage 3) than they actually performed these stages during actual execution (see Figure 2   15 and Table 2 ). 16 Post-experiment Questionnaire 17 Participants' answers to the questionnaire established that they imagined performing 18 the task from the agreed perspective. Answers also confirmed that the gymnasts did not omit In this study, we aimed to investigate the temporal functional equivalence between 4 physical performance of a gymnastic vault and imagery of the same task from an internal 5 visual perspective and also from an external visual perspective. We also aimed to consider the internal clock for mental and actual executions. The finding that motor imagery and physical 1 execution of a skill may share a similar temporal driver should not be completely surprising 2 given the volume of research showing the activation of common brain areas for these two 3 processes (Grèzes & Decety, 2001 ). 4 The novelty of the present study was that imagery was also performed from an 5 external visual perspective. It was predicted that mental simulation of the full vault would be 6 faster than actual execution since the external visual perspective should involve less motor 7 processing as suggested by Mackay (1981; 1982) . This was not the case. The time to imagine 8 the full vault from a third-person perspective was not significantly different to the time 9 required to physically perform it. We suggest that this finding may be explained by research 10 that has shown that the cortical motor system was active during both overt movement and 11 external imagery of a rotation task (e.g., Ganis, Keenan, Kosslyn, & Pascual-Leone, 2000; 12 Kosslyn, Digirolamo, Thompson, & Alpert, 1998) . Imaging the full vault from an external 13 visual perspective required the gymnast to simulate mental rotations. Therefore, we suggest 14 that motor, in addition to visual, mechanisms may be active during the external visual 15 imagery condition and that this may explain the equality between actual and imagined actions. 16 For skilled performers, internal and external visual imagery displayed the same 17 temporal characteristics. This suggests that imagery conducted from a third-person 18 perspective may contain sufficient propositional information for these individuals to access 19 the representation in the same way as an internal perspective (Holmes & Collins, 2001 , 2002 . 20 
Chronometric Comparison of Actual and Imaged Vault Stages

21
Trial was included as a factor in the design since Decety (1991) has showed that there 22 is the potential for temporal inconsistency across actual and imagined trials as a result of 23 feedback. This was not the case in this study and probably reflects the skill level of the 24 participants. In only one case (trial 1 duration was faster than trial 3 duration for the first stage 25 CHRONOMETRIC COMPARISON 20 of the vault irrespective of perspective and condition) was there a difference. The condition 1 factor (mental and actual) and the perspective factor (internal and external) were 2 indistinguishable since they were averaged in the post-hoc comparisons. Only the stage factor 3 and trial factor could be discriminated. 4 The data also revealed that the temporal aspects of the vault components were not 5 consistent across imagery and actual conditions. Participants in both visual perspective 6 conditions imaged stage 1 (run phase) at a significantly faster rate than the physical condition, 7 stages 2 and 3 (first flight phase and arm support phase) at a significantly slower rate as the 8 physical condition and stage 4 (second flight phase) at the same speed as that which they 9 actually performed. reports are made since the activity is performed in a less conscious state. These different 7 levels of processing may account directly for the temporal discrepancy between the imagined 8 and physical conditions during these stages. 9 A further explanation can be proposed to explain the longer mental duration of these 10 stages. Decety et al. (1989) and Jeannerod (1994) have shown that participants perceived an 11 increase in force as an increase in mental movement duration. This proposal supports the 12 gymnasts' reports. They explained that stages 2 and 3 required more effort and force than the 13 other stages because "you have to hit the springboard strongly and to push your arms to 14 perform successfully" (Gymnast X). The absence of these afferent forces during both imagery 15 conditions may have been perceived as additional time (Jeannerod, 1997). 16 The different results observed for the vault stages may also be explained by the 17 relationship between actual and mental duration which can be modified by the length of the 18 motor sequence. In the present study, the first stage, where imagined movement time was 19 faster than actual movement time, was also longer in duration than the other stages. 20 Conversely, stages 2 and 3, for which imagery times were slower than the actual times, were wave interacted with the actual duration of the wave; the longer the actual duration of a wave, 1 the shorter the mental duration of surfing on this wave. The relationship between actual and 2 simulated movement is clearly not simple. Reed (2002) has also shown that the relationship 3 can be altered by the participants' expertise and by the complexity of the skill. She showed 4 that, as skill complexity increases, imagery durations become longer and that, unlike novices 5 or experts, imagery durations for intermediate divers were slower than those of actual 6 durations. The extent that movement complexity and/or duration influenced imagery times in 7 the current study cannot be fully discussed and certainly warrants further investigation. 8 In a practical sense, it is also possible that stages 2 and 3 were extended in the imagery 9 conditions as a direct result of the emphasis placed on these elements by coaches at this level This study investigated a series of complex motor skills performed by expert athletes. 17 These participants are not numerous and the findings may only be applicable to similarly 18 skilled groups. A within-subject comparison of imagery would have been a more effective 19 design, but to maintain ecological validity this was not possible. The gymnasts were unable to 20 employ the alternative visual perspective; in fact, they refused to mentally simulate their vault 21 exercise from their non-dominant perspective knowing that the aim was to perform the action 22 afterwards. A significantly modified pre-performance routine was considered unethical if 23 changing their imagery routines increased the risk of them being hurt. We also recognize that 24 CHRONOMETRIC COMPARISON 23 the results could be linked equally to imagery perspective or imagery ability with the current 1 design. Future research should examine this issue further. 2 Despite these limitations, the study presents important findings. First, it has 3 investigated the functional equivalence concept of a complex, well-learnt motor skill 4 performed by elite athletes in an ecologically-valid setting. Second, dividing the action into 5 stages has supplied a more refined appraisal of the temporal organization of a complex action 6 not previously considered. Third, examining the temporal functional equivalence during 7 imagery from an external visual perspective should promote greater use of this perspective for 8 experienced performers as its temporal aspects were found to be the same as those of the 9 internal perspective. Finally, the debrief interviews highlighted that there may be a number of 10 additional imagery characteristics that may have had an influence on imagined time. These 11 include concurrent kinesthesis which has been shown to influence image time. However, the 12 reports of kinesthesis were consistent across visual perspective and therefore remain to be 13 examined more fully in future studies. 14 
Conclusion 15
At the simplest level, the study would seem to provide partial support for functional 16 equivalence considered through a timing paradigm. The findings revealed that the duration of 17 an imagined motor task was not significantly different from the time required to actually 18 perform it irrespective of the visual perspective employed. However, when the motor task was 19 considered more fully in its component stages, correspondence between imagined and actual 20 times was lost. Three of the four stages of the task exhibited absolute temporal discrepancies 21 between the imagery and physical conditions. These results cannot be discussed in the context 22 of any previous research because, to our knowledge, no research has fully addressed this 23 relationship. These results suggest the cautious interpretation of previous research in this area 
